

Annotating for Transparent Inquiry in Qualitative Foreign Policy Decision-making Research: Making Archival Documents Accessible


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- The problem
 - Archival documents inaccessible
- A solution (in general)
 - Annotation for Transparent Inquiry
- A solution (in particular)
 - My paper on the international recognition of Bangladesh

The problem

- Political science research using primary source historical evidence
 - Sources inaccessible
 - Interpretation inscrutable
 - Context unknown
- Anecdotes
 - Canadian Cabinet memorandum
 - Kissinger memo to Ford on Japan Visit


A solution (in general)



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MAKING QUALITATIVE RESEARCH MORE TRANSPARENT

Announcing the Annotation for Transparent Inquiry (ATI) Initiative

We are excited to announce the first round of published projects from our **Annotation for Transparent Inquiry (ATI) Initiative**. ATI creates a digital overlay on top of articles generated through qualitative and multi-method research published on journal web pages. That overlay connects specific passages of text to author-generated annotations.

ATI's annotations include 'analytic notes' discussing data generation and analysis, excerpts from data sources, and links to those sources stored in trusted digital repositories. Readers are able to view annotations immediately alongside the main text, removing the need to jump to footnotes or separate appendices. Sharing the data sources via a secure repository ensures that they are findable, accessible, interoperable, reusable, and preserved for the long term, and that human participants are protected.

A solution (in particular)

- ATI annotation of my paper
- Analysis of decisions to recognize Bangladesh
 - Model of how rhetoric and argumentation works in foreign policy
 - Used primary sources
 - Withdrawal of Indian troops from Bangladesh a socially-constructed requirement for recognition



A solution (in particular)

The Role of Troop Withdrawal

After Sheikh Mujib was released from captivity in West Pakistan, he traveled to London where, in a meeting on 8 January 1972, the British government impressed upon him the importance of Indian troop withdrawal for the recognition of Bangladesh.⁷⁷ However, the connection between these two things was not immediately apparent. For example, UK Ambassador to Turkey Roderick Sarell reported that the senior members of the Turkish foreign policy establishment had agreed to not recognize Bangladesh only after the Indian troop presence in Bangladesh was re-

77. Notes on Heath-Mujib Meeting, 8 January 1972, PREM 15/751.

78. Cable from Sarell, 25 January 1972, UK National Archives, Foreign and FCO 37/1020.

A solution (in particular)

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


FIGURE 2. *Timing and Recognition of Bangladesh*

upon him the importance of Indian troop withdrawal for the recognition of Bangladesh.⁷⁷ However, the connection between these two things was not immediately apparent. For example, UK Ambassador to Turkey Roderick Sarell reported that the senior members of the Turkish foreign policy establishment had agreed to not recognize Bangladesh only after the Indian troop presence in Bangladesh was presented to them as an issue and a barrier to recognition.⁷⁸ Similarly, the Sri Lankan (Ceylonese) government asked “whether Mujib has stated publicly that Mrs Gandhi has agreed to withdraw Indian forces on his request,” but only after having it explained to them that withdrawal was relevant to recognition.⁷⁹ Mujib and members of the Indian government insisted that Indian troops were in Bangladesh only at the request of the Bangladeshi administration and Gandhi and Mujib jointly declared on 8 February 1972 that India would withdraw all its troops from Bangladesh by 25 March.⁸⁰ Mujib in fact declared that all troops were withdrawn on 13 March.⁸¹

77. Notes on Heath-Mujib Meeting, 8 January 1972, PREM 15/751.

78. Cable from Sarell, 25 January 1972, UK National Archives, Foreign and Commonwealth Offices, FCO 37/1020.

79. Cable from Mackintosh, 25 January 1972, FCO 37/1020.

80. “Firm Stand Taken by Mujib in Talks: Bangladesh Shows Desire to Cut Loose From India,” *New York Times*, 9 February 1972, 9.

81. “India’s Soldiers Quit Bangladesh: Ceremonies in Dacca Mark Pullout After Three Months,” *New York Times*, 13 March 1972, 7.

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Analytic Note: This is an extract from briefing notes for the Prime Minister Edward Heath for a meeting between him and Sheikh Mujibur Rahman at 18.30 hours, Saturday, 8 January, from folder 15/751 of the Prime Minister’s Archives held at the National Archives at Kew, UK. This extract shows both that the Prime Minister was advised to explicitly link recognition and the presence of the Indian Army in Bangladesh and also that Mujib likely was aware of this linkage due to an informal meeting with his representative 2 days before the meeting with the Prime Minister.

Source Excerpt: Mujib will press for early recognition by HMG. The British Government accepts the fact of Bangladesh. However, given the continuing role of the Indian Army our criteria for recognition are not yet satisfied. We must also look to our relations with the Government in Islamabad. So far only the Governments of India and Bhutan [sic] have accorded recognition and we will wish to act with others. However, we do not wish to delay too long and in the meantime the Bangladesh Government should exercise patience in their interest as well as ours. These points have already been made by the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary at an informal discreet meeting on 6 January with Mr Justice Choudhury, the Bangladesh representative in London who has since left for Dacca.

Data Source: <https://data.qdr.syr.edu/file.xhtml?fileId=2558>

Full Citation: Edward Heath, British Prime Minister (1970-1974), extract from briefing notes for the Prime Minister Edward Heath for a meeting between him and Sheikh Mujibur Rahman at 18.30 hours, 8 January 1972. Folder 15/751, of the Prime Minister’s Archives held at the National Archives at Kew, UK.

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A solution (in particular)

2. The Prime Minister might cover the following topics:

a. RECOGNITION

Mujib will press for early recognition by HMG. The British Government accepts the fact of Bangladesh. However, given the continuing rôle of the Indian Army our criteria for recognition are not yet satisfied. We must also look to our relations with the Government in Islamabad. So far only the Governments of India and Bhuttan have accorded recognition and we will wish to

A solution (in particular)

TABLE 2. *Conditioning Recognition on Indian Troop Withdrawal*

<i>State</i>	<i>Stated reason(s)</i>	<i>Stated condition</i>	<i>Reference</i>
Argentina	Other	Withdrawal	FCO 37/1020
Australia	Control of territory, Self-determination	Statement	PREM 15/751; FCO 37/1023
Belgium	Non-aggression	—	S/PV. 1607: 222
Burundi	Non-aggression	—	S/PV. 1621: 56
Canada	Control of territory	Statement	FCO 37/1020
Ceylon / Sri Lanka	Non-aggression	Statement	FCO 37/1020; FCO 37/1023
China	Non-aggression	Withdrawal	FRUS 69-76 XI: 274
Cyprus	Control of territory, Self-determination	Agreement	FCO 37/1020
France	Control of territory	Agreement	FCO 37/1019
Indonesia	Non-aggression, Control of territory	Statement	FCO 37/1020; FCO 37/1025
Ireland	—	—	FCO 37/1020
Italy	—	Statement	FCO 37/1023
Japan	—	—	FCO 37/1024
Malawi	Control of territory, Self-determination	Statement	FCO 37/1025
Malaysia	Non-aggression, Control of territory	Statement	FCO 37/1023
Mexico	Non-aggression, Self-determination	Withdrawal	FCO 37/1020
Nigeria	Other (secessionism)	Withdrawal	FCO 37/1024
Philippines	Other (secessionism)	Withdrawal	FCO 37/1023
Senegal	Control of territory	—	FCO 37/1020
Sierra Leone	—	Withdrawal	FCO 37/1025
Somalia	Non-aggression	—	S/PV. 1606: 240
Syria	—	—	S/PV. 1606: 374
Turkey	Control of territory	Withdrawal	FCO 37/1020
UK	Control of territory, Self-determination	Agreement	FCO 37/1020; PREM 15/751
US	Non-aggression, Other	Withdrawal	FRUS 69-76 XI:315
USSR	—	Statement	FCO 37/902

Notes: FCO: UK Foreign and Commonwealth Offices Archives; S/PV: United Nations Security Council Official Record; PREM: UK Premiers Archives; FRUS: Foreign Relations of the United States series.

A solution (in particular)

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example, Australia's justification of its decision to recognize Bangladesh includes that "there was no doubt of the breadth and depth of the support which Sheikh Mujib's Government enjoyed among the people of Bangla Desh."⁹¹

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France	Control of territory	Agreement	FCO 37/1019
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Ireland	—	—	FCO 37/1020
Italy	—	Statement	FCO 37/1023
Japan	—	—	FCO 37/1024
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Malaysia	Non-aggression, Control of territory	Statement	FCO 37/1023
Mexico	Non-aggression, Self-determination	Withdrawal	FCO 37/1020
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The third type of reason was whether the Mujib administration had control of the territory. This was part of the often-cited international legal criteria and played a central part in several states' reasoning. For example, Mitchell Sharp, Canadian

recognition, on the basis of normal criteria and law and order, and that the Foreign Minister had publicly linked that to the issue of control of territory and "independence" so possibly also self-determination as well.

Source Excerpt: Canadians agree that recognition is inevitable and desirable and they too would prefer to recognise with other like-minded governments. But they believe timing to be premature in relation to normal criteria for recognition as long as law and order is manifestly dependent on presence of Indian troops. Before release of Mujib they had had in mind recognition in three to six months time on assumption that by

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Analysis Note: This is a telegram of 28 January 1972 from Peter A. Wilde, UK Deputy High Commissioner to Ceylon, to the FCO in London, from folder 37/1023 of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office's Archives at Kew, UK. This excerpt summarizes a conversation between Gunasingham, the director of the Ceylonese Asia section of the Department of External Affairs, and the UK Head of Chancery in the UK Embassy to Ceylon. This is evidence that a key decision maker explicitly used India's aggression as a reason not to recognize, or to delay recognition of, Bangladesh. The fact that this information was given at a party and not as an official line could mean that this was more genuine feelings revealed in an unguarded moment. This adds to other evidence (i.e. omahoney_archivefco2_1972) showing that others in the ministry felt that whether Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi

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- Annotation for Transparent Inquiry
 - Online tool increasing transparency of archival research
 - Makes qualitative foreign policy decision-making research more reproducible
 - Allows original data to be more accessible