

***Understanding the
challenge: how
cybercrime has evolved
to become a modern
Serious Organised Crime***

*Maximising Impact from Serious
Organised Crime Research, Cyber
Crimes & Online Criminal Markets.*
University of Cambridge, Sept. 16th
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Interdisciplinary Cybercrime Research At Leeds

– Work in Progress



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I am interested in changes in the cybercrime threat landscape, especially the ways that offenders have become more adaptive and organised to challenge law enforcement. I am also interested in potential for offenders to develop powerful, sustainable online organised crime groups. I draw from three research projects.

- Combatting cRiminals in The Cloud (EPSRC CRITiCaI) 2015-22
- Ransomware and Cybercrimes of Extortion (EPSRC/ ESRC EMPHASIS)
(EconoMical, PsychHologicAI and Societal Impact of RanSomware (2017 –2019))
- Understanding Organised Crime and Terrorist Networks (H2020 2016-19)

A recent article relevant to this presentation is:

Wall, D.S. (2021) 'The Transnational Cybercrime Extortion Landscape and the Pandemic: changes in ransomware offender tactics, attack scalability and the organisation of offending', *European Law Enforcement Research Bulletin*, 22, (publication forthcoming) **PREPRINT available**

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3908159

1. Cybercrime as (Transnational) modern serious organised crime



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
My research into cybercrime is finding that

- *Cybercrime offenders are more professional than before.* From a business studies manual and NOT organised crime playbook.
- *More ruthless, now triple extortion methods, N&S, Data, DDoS*
- *The increased yield of proceeds from cybercrime is causing skilled potential actors to choose cybercrime as a career*
- *Offenders are supported by, or are part of, a cybercrime ecosystem which facilitates cybercrimes – RaaS, Data Market.*
- *The cybercrime ecosystem system is the new face of organised crime, with specialist services run by brokers/ kinpins*
- *There is no one Mr or Mrs Big.* E.g. recent ransomware arrests got the bit players (monetiser), so only disrupted operations
- *Offenders are incredibly adaptive, but cybersecurity and law enforcement tend to be rule based and irrelatively inflexible – there are still elements of reassurance policing to be seen.*

2. The evolution of ransomware as a modern cybercrime RW1-RW3




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3. Increase in scalability – increasing attacks on Multiple Service Providers and The Supply Chain



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


4. Profile of business victims – Jan 2020 – June 2021



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
Attackers target small medium organisations



5. Profile of attack groups – Jan 2020 – June 2021 by volume



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6. There are nine basic stages to a ransomware attack



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1. Identify the best victims to attack – the reconnaissance
2. Gaining ‘initial access’ by infiltrating the victim’s network
3. Escalating computing access privileges in the system
4. Identifying key organisational data that will hurt when lost
5. Exfiltrating the key data and installing ransomware
6. Naming and shaming victims & levying the ransom demand
7. Payment of the ransom demand in cryptocurrency
8. Monetaring the crime – cryptocurrency into fiat money
9. Post-crime - “getting away” with the crime once completed

7. From hobby to profession – making cybercrime pay - Scaling up Cybercrime



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Databrokers – Crimeware aas – Spammers – Darkmarket – Botherders – IT Services - Monetisers

Increased size = increased risk & complexity

Specialisation reduces risk & complexity

The division of labour divides as the scale of the operation grows

The Individual

Performs all functions

8. The Cybercrime Ecosystem



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DATABROKERS

Sell/ Trade Stolen Datasets

Sell Victim profiles

Sell Access to Illegal data streaming

Data is used by offender groups in different ways

DARKMARKETEERS

Providing selling/ trading services
(usually via the ToR network)

ENGAGERS + INITIAL ACCESS BROKERS

Engage victims or Access
organisations and sell on details

CRIMEWARE-as-a service

Rent out:

DDoS Stressers

Ransomware-as-a-service

Spam-ware-as-a-service

Botnets (Botherders)

MONETIZERS

Organise and Manage a financial
return

Crypto-exchange

Money laundering

Money mules

Financial advisers

BULLETPROOF HOSTERS

Web hosters which allow criminal
www materials

CRIME IT SERVICE BROKERS

Sell and write code

Sell vulnerabilities (Bug Brokers)

NEGOTIATORS - Negotiate the ransom payment
RANSOMWARE CONSULTANTS (Offender Side)
CYBERSECURITY NEGOTIATORS (Victim Side)

9. Conclusion: The new challenges of cybercrime for law and enforcement



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- ***Ransomware is a blended cybercrime*** as it i) comprises more than one crime and ii) combines the social with science – social engineering & negotiators.
- ***Statistically, ransomware is problematic and hard to record.*** In the UK, the ‘ransom’ and ‘ware’ are recorded as different statistics. They also constitute different bodies of law and fall under different policing agencies.
- ***These agencies have untrusted relationships with industry,*** especially when victims pay the ransom because they i) do not want their victimisation to become public and ii) want to resolve the matter quickly.
- ***Public and private interests often clash*** to hinder the search for justice.
- ***Needs co-ownership of problem to co-produce the solution***