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## THE QUEST FOR MODERNISATION AND THE PRODUCTION OF THE CHINESE NATION

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## **THE QUEST FOR MODERNISATION AND THE PRODUCTION OF THE CHINESE NATION**

Since the late nineteenth century when modernisation first became an important issue in the political programmes of Chinese leadership facing an aggressive military challenge from the colonial powers, the goals and mechanisms of modernisation have changed significantly. The current course of economic reforms and modernisation initiated in the late 1970s was preceded by a century of war and revolution associated with profound national and class struggle. Today China officially adheres to market economy and the communist ideology as its guiding principles for modernisation. Its new developmental agenda has not completely replaced the earlier socialist rhetoric: instead, the two are synthesised and modified using cultural elements. But the rhetoric of modernisation and economic development driven by market forces dominates the leadership's political programme. Recently China's modernisation has been studied as a distinct socio-economic and political project<sup>1</sup> and a factor shaping perceptions, values, and social relations in China<sup>2</sup>, but so far little has been said about the relationship between Chinese perspectives on modernisation and China's national idea.

Given its predominance in the official and scholarly thinking in China, it is surprising that China's perspectives on modernisation do not attract wider scholarly attention. Perhaps the lack of critical engagement with modernisation debates in China can be attributed to the fact that modernisation theories are increasingly seen as an outdated mode of thinking on historical processes and have been largely thrown to the backyard of intellectual history by alternative perspectives. In China, however, modernisation and debates around it occupy an uninterrupted and dominating presence in ideological, policy-related, social and scholarly debates. Modernisation has been an ongoing goal of the Chinese leadership ever since this

concept entered the Chinese political vocabulary in the mid- nineteenth century. The nation- salvation projects have been accompanied by a modernising agenda aimed at creating a stronger and independent Chinese state. This preoccupation with the formation of China as a strong and independent state has been a constant component of Beijing's nationalism. Realisation of this national goal pursued by Chinese leadership has been informed and guided by a particular vision of China's future and ways of attaining it.

This article emphasises the close relationship between state-led nationalism and the idea of modernisation. This discussion stresses the performative and constitutive role of ideas: through analysing the production of a particular knowledge of the development process, one can attain a picture of the kind of Chinese nation that is envisioned. While this article shows that the official interpretation of modernisation does not reveal the direction of China's 'unique' development policies, the present analysis sheds light on the format of the Chinese state-led national project and the premises on which it rests. Chinese modernisation perspectives do not offer an alternative path of development, but a variation on the modernisation theory without recognising its inherent problems. China's official modernisation studies are not scientific calculations of the development progress, but ideological perspectives on what the Chinese state aspires to be nationally and internationally, and how on the path of fulfilling its dreams it deals with difference.

I argue that while many official discussions emphasise China's allegedly alternative path of development, there is an inescapable dependency on, in many ways, outdated Western mode of thinking about the development path. This production of ostensibly scientific knowledge reveals how China as a nation is produced through the creation of a series of dichotomies and oppositions along the factors of territory and ethnicity. At the international level, China's experiences of modernisation are juxtaposed to those of the generic West, while at the domestic level China's modernisation is delineated through the opposition between the eastern and western regions, and ethnic populations associated with

them. This language of modernisation also informs the formulations of societal values of Chinese transformations as well as China's foreign policy initiatives and relies on the suppression of other possible development paths.

The first section of this article traces the development of modernisation debates in China's official circles since the start of the period of reform and the opening-up of the country. The second section examines the main tenets of the Second Modernisation Theory informing annual official publication *China Modernisation Reports*, and compares them to the earlier Western analogues and the official modernisation discourse. The third section discusses how China's geo-body is employed in the Second Modernisation Theory to explain development processes both in China and throughout the world, and the effects of the politics of identity on China's construction as a modernising nation. The fourth section looks at what human values are celebrated as desirable in the process of modernisation, and the implications of this for the formulation of membership in the Chinese nation. The final section describes how China's modernisation goals are projected onto the international realm and how the contours of the Chinese nation are shaped by the newly emergent discourse on international modernisation.

### **In-between Party ideology and Western modernisation theories**

Chinese academic debate on Westernisation of China and its convergence with traditional Chinese culture has been evolving for over one hundred and fifty years.<sup>3</sup> Themes of the past are echoed in present-day Chinese scholarly discussions. The disillusionment of intellectuals with previous communist 'modernising' efforts in China has plunged some into a crisis of confidence about Chinese society; they question its ability to modernise without complete Westernisation.<sup>4</sup> Yet early attempts at Western-type modernisation were not particularly

successful, and culminated in a prolonged, humiliating semi-colonial position still much remembered in China. Thus, the first Western-oriented modernisation experiment, the Self-Strengthening movement of 1861-1895, is very much associated with the imperialist phase of the history of China. As a result, since the start of a new modernisation initiative in the late 1970s, a debate over the level of Westernisation of the modernisation process and the place of traditional Chinese values in it erupted again. While some have argued that from the moment of initiating the reforms in the late 1970s the PRC has accepted the Western mode of modernity,<sup>5</sup> the prevailing opinion in the academic debate on the concept of ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics’ is that China has uneasily integrated the Western concept with Chinese particulars.<sup>6</sup> Chinese characteristics in the debate on modernisation are an expression of the ideological orientations of the Chinese Communist Party.

The PRC’s central government took the first steps toward nonrevolutionary modernisation as early as 1965, when Zhou Enlai, then the Chinese premier, declared at the Third National People’s Congress that the nation’s goal was the realization of the Four Modernisations—in agriculture, industry, national defence, and science and technology—before the end of the twentieth century. These ideas were abandoned during the Cultural Revolution, only to be reaffirmed in 1975, when at the Fourth National People’s Congress Deng Xiaoping called for four modernisations. Then, at the Fourteenth National Congress of the Communist Party held in October 1992, the official goal of Four Modernisations was replaced by the formulation of a ‘socialist, modernised country which is wealthy, powerful, democratic and civilized’, or, more generally, ‘socialist modernisation with Chinese characteristics’.<sup>7</sup> At the same congress, Deng Xiaoping’s development doctrine was officially recognised as the theoretical basis for China’s reforms.

With the government’s encouragement, Chinese scholars enthusiastically initiated the study of modernisation, and attempted to design a unique Chinese model of it. With the start

of reforms, it became prevalent in academic circles and government cabinets to explore how to attain China's comprehensive modernisation. Such investigations became even more prominent in the 1990s, when political and social aspects of the reforms were cut short. The discussions about possible modernisation paths were also influenced by the popularisation of the ideology of developmentalism as advanced by the key international organisations of development. In this environment, the study of modernisation and especially its economic aspects replaced euphoric discussions of China's political transformations. This obsession with the production of the verifiable 'scientific' knowledge of China's development path became central to the modernisation debates in China and the Party's formulations of the state's national agenda. It is most visible in the pronouncement and popularisation of the 'scientific development' as the new doctrine of the PRC's leadership.<sup>8</sup> Besides borrowing from Western theories, the official scholarly discourse on modernisation also reflects the Party's ideological principles of socialism. In fact, most of the influential modernisation scholars rely on Deng Xiaoping's theory of modernisation as the departure point for their research. An accelerating modernisation craze triggered the opening of numerous research centres and institutes devoted to investigating the meaning and logic of the modernisation process. In the late 1990s China started to publish yearly reports on modernisation and economic development, producing numerical measures of China's progress towards its goals. One of these reports is the *China Modernisation Report*, which includes a modernisation index, a measure of the level of modernisation not only of all thirty-one provinces and autonomous regions in China, but also of most countries in the world.

Much dominant discussion on modernisation in China relies on the Second Modernisation Theory, a theoretical foundation of the *China Modernisation Reports*. This theory occupies a specific space in official and intellectual fields in China. It is remarkable that the theory, along with the *China Modernisation Reports*, is produced within the walls of the most influential Chinese academic establishment for 'hard science', the Chinese

Academy of Science, rather than in its equivalent in the fields of Social Sciences and Humanities, the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. Notwithstanding the proclaimed official focus of ‘scientific development’ on the people as the centre of China’s development project, development is seen as an object for study by supposedly neutral ‘hard science’. Another interesting fact is that the *China Modernisation Reports* are published by Beijing University Press rather than the China Statistics Press, the official bureau in charge of practically all statistical yearbooks in China. Rather than relying solely on the statistical data produced at different levels of the Chinese government and on ideological directions formulated by the Communist Party and state leaders, these publications are the product of intellectual efforts by a team of scholars. They offer ‘scientific’ knowledge that adds weight to the officially formulated state policies. While integrating much of the official line, the reports make use of Western theories and data produced by international organisations. The scope of the reports goes beyond China, as the aim of the Second Modernisation Theory is to provide a generalised explanation of the development path of not only China but the rest of the world. As such, the Second Modernisation Theory reflects the roles of ‘science’, the so-called Western knowledge, official ideology and the interpretations of historical progress in the production of China’s national project.<sup>9</sup>

### **Second Modernisation Theory**

Behind the creation of the Second Modernisation Theory stands the figure of essentially one scholar. Professor He Chuanqi is the head of the China Centre for Modernisation Research at the Chinese Academy of Sciences and the Centre for Studies of World Modernisation Processes at Beijing University. His concept of the Second Modernisation was first put forward in 1998 in a journal article and later served as the basis for a major study published as a book in 1999. The Second Modernisation Theory is

presented by He as the contribution of Chinese researchers to general theories of modernisation and human civilisation overall.<sup>10</sup> He argues that a contemporary world historical analysis which does not take into account China's experiences 'is not a complete world'.<sup>11</sup> China's experience, according to He, can be instructive for understanding the general development process of other societies in the world. The Second Modernisation Theory is thus claimed to be both China-specific and general enough to explain development processes outside China. He correlates the processes of human civilisation and development and presents the Second Modernisation Theory as the first attempt to view the development of human civilisation through the modernisation process.<sup>12</sup> Chinese studies of the struggles of the Chinese modernisation process from the Republican and socialist periods are neither reflected nor mentioned in He Chuanqi's theory. It relies on the Western theories on the modernisation process as the only legitimate body of knowledge on which to base the Chinese theory, even if it is critical of them.

He Chuanqi contends that another important reason for developing the Chinese theory of modernisation is that it serves as an expression of China's growing influence. In other words, the theory shows China's capability to develop its own theoretical paradigms of development and to generate new theories, which, in He's view, are signs of the nation's 'quality'.<sup>13</sup> In line with his thought, production of knowledge and innovation, including in the fields of humanities and social sciences, is a manifestation of high national quality; a population's ability to learn, innovate, and contribute to general knowledge is valued as a national asset.<sup>14</sup> A nation's quality is also stressed as the guarantor of China's successful performance at the international level and a condition for successfully tackling future challenges:

China has a splendid history, an ancient culture and an ingenious people.

There is nothing in the world that can stop the advance of China, restrict the wisdom of the Chinese people, contain the momentum of China's



innovation, or limit the space of China's development. Innovation, learning, knowledge and human resources constitute the greatest wealth and also the flying wings of the Chinese nation. Although the challenges ahead are unprecedented, history is made by man. A nation that has created a splendid history can certainly create an entirely new future.<sup>15</sup>

Similar to earlier Western modernisation theories as well as Marxist evolutionary interpretations, He Chuanqi divides the process of human development from 2.5 million years ago to the year 2100 into several stages. These include the tool age, agricultural age, industrial age, and information age, each of which is also divided into several phases: the start, development, maturity, and transition phases. The Second Modernisation is the process of changing from an industrial society to a knowledge society, an industrial economy to a knowledge economy, an industrial civilisation to a knowledge civilisation, and an industrial age to a knowledge age. According to He Chuanqi, for advanced societies the second modernisation will take more than 100 years (1971–2100).<sup>16</sup> As for developing societies, they have to face the challenges of both the first and second modernisations simultaneously.

The period of the second modernisation in China, according to He, started with the launch of economic reforms in the late 1970s. One objective of the first stage of the second modernisation was to double the total output value by 1990 and then redouble it by 2000. Since 1997, China has embarked on the development of knowledge economy and innovation systems. In the English-language summary of his theory, *Outlook of China Modernization Report (2001–2007)*, He Chuanqi projects what modernisation will look like in 2050 and argues that China's modernisation strategy should be revised in view of the desired goals.<sup>17</sup> In other words, the process of modernisation should be guided by the vision of modernisation in the future. The linear development He anticipates promises the era of prosperity at the end of the path for China and everyone. This stress on innovation, progressive development,

technological achievement and particular scientific knowledge from the perspective of the desired outcome dismisses as invalid other forms of knowledge and visions of development. For example, the official opinion that prevails among the leadership in China is that one of the most serious problems for China's ethnic minorities' development is their 'unhealthy mentality',<sup>18</sup> which is largely associated with their traditional (i.e., premodern) ways of life, and that economic development is the sole practical solution to the ethnic question.<sup>19</sup> This dominant way of thinking does not account for actually existing alternative development paths that incorporate solicitous attitudes toward nature and directed at conservancy and environmental protection, such as the Naxi Dongba tradition of treating trees as brothers, the Tibetan worshiping of trees, and the Dai tradition of growing trees to be felled for people's livelihood.<sup>20</sup>

While the *China Modernisation Report* recognises China's cultural diversity and acknowledges that 35 out of China's 56 ethnic groups live in the 12 regions of the Yangtze River Valley, the linear progression of civilisation that it posits leads to a particular mode of thinking about how the development of diverse populations within China should evolve. Each stage of the development of civilisation, neatly categorised into primitive, agricultural, industrial and knowledge societies, is applied to the regions along the Yangtze River, starting from the border between Tibet and Qinghai and finishing in Shanghai. The authors of the *China Modernisation Report* state that the model demonstrates 'the top-down unevenness and orderliness' of the development process: 'From the upper reaches to the lower reaches, social productivity (per capita GDP and the per capita GDP at PPP) rises, the proportion of agriculture declines, and both the proportion of industry and the proportion of the labour force in the service industry rise. The level of economic development in the lower reaches is visibly higher than in the middle and upper reaches'.<sup>21</sup> A similar analysis is applied to social indicators.<sup>22</sup> This analysis, echoing the Marxist evolutionary teleology, classifies China's regions and groups associated with them according to their particular stages of socio-

economic development, an approach that has been identified as one of the tools for ‘naturalising’ how the development process works.<sup>23</sup>

He Chuanqi’s interpretation of modernisation comes down to treating the economy and technological development as the key driving forces of societal development. This approach puts the forms of economic organisation above the values inherent in the form of social organisation, and diminishes the role of cultural and similar ‘spiritual’ and non-material values in the process. Modernisation becomes a mechanical tool of ‘total output value’ production, while other aspects of societal life are secondary and serve the main objective. However, as Radtke observes, ‘culture is not an adjunct to social organisation’ and an open-market economy does not automatically lead to the development of a modern society.<sup>24</sup> The goal-oriented view of the modernisation process leads to disproportionate implementation of specific economic policies, and unrest among segments of society who culturally or psychologically do not or refuse to keep up with economic growth. Moreover, the meaning of modernisation as promoted by the official rhetoric often differs from how it is interpreted by the wider population. For example, Chih-yu Shih’s study shows that some ethnic minorities in China do not understand the meaning of modernisation suggested by the Han-dominated state.<sup>25</sup> On the contrary, modernisation fuels the concerns of these ethnic minorities to preserve their distinctiveness and uniqueness in the process of transformation.

He Chuanqi also emphasises the process of human development especially for the period of the Second Modernisation, with development strategies focused on the human being. Nevertheless, modernisation progress, including the advancement of human subjects, according to He, can be measured and expressed in numerical or another verifiable form. The criteria for quantifying modernisation are considered to be universal and applicable not only to different regions within China but to most countries in the world. This way of thinking neglects the diversity within China and disregards the importance of it on a world scale. The theory only allows for one standard of modernisation, which must be reached in a certain

period of time, and does not ask what will happen after a country or region achieves the necessary modernisation parameters.

The theory is presented in the manner of a five-year Party political programme, with clear-cut objectives including pre-determined numerical economic goals. This does not allow for much flexibility and adaptability in the process of market reform. However, in the course of historical development a set goal tends to change into a new aim. Early modern Chinese reformers such as Zhang Jian, the minister of agriculture and commerce in early Republican China, argued in favour of deep systemic changes but did not specify any concrete goal or transformations, which Christiansen characterised as pragmatic thinking.<sup>26</sup> To stipulate, not to mention numerically define, the goal, as history suggests, is short-sighted. To quote Radtke, we are 'unable to discuss history in teleological terms'. It is impossible to predict whether modernisation will bring a country towards an outlined goal.<sup>27</sup> So, rather than prescribing a definite path of development, modernisation debates in China show how China as a nation is produced through the formulation and pursuit of a particular kind of development model and how difference within and outside China is accounted for.

The modernisation project rests on a certain set of values rather than the nation-state's attributes, such as territoriality and state sovereignty (though these attributes are by no means dismissed). The official discourse on modernisation defines the 'true' patterns of transformation, and thus predetermines the parameters of change in the nation-state. Modernisation and nation are both powerful constructs concerned with who can be designated either a modern or a nonmodern subject of the Chinese nation. The discourses of modernisation and nationalism both deal with articulating and representing the Chinese nation and modernity. They are mutually constitutive because in the context of the official Chinese discourses on modernisation and the Chinese nation they create parallel linear narratives of the nation. The discourse on the Chinese nation is located in history and looks towards the future of China's development, while the narrative of modernisation presents the

present development from the point of view of goals that are set to be attained by a certain period in the future. The future of the Chinese nation is premised on the successful accomplishment of the modernisation process. In other words, modernisation determines the path of national development from the perspective of its goals. The language of modernisation also often serves as legitimising rhetoric, as all transformations are undertaken for the purpose of achieving a strong and modernised Chinese nation. The official discourse on modernisation produces a particular knowledge of what constitutes a modern nation, and designates how the dominant formulation of the Chinese nation is produced, delimiting its contours.

In Appadurai's writing on the modernity of imagination, he attacks 'social theories of the ruptures of modernisation' on the grounds that they assume a teleological premise for interpreting modernisation as a universal recipe for 'rationality, democracy, the free market, and a higher gross national product'.<sup>28</sup> He also criticizes the dominant theories for their preoccupation with prognoses for and outcomes of projects of 'social engineering'.<sup>29</sup> These deficiencies in early Western interpretations of modernisation seem to have been uncritically imported by their more pronounced recent Chinese version. For example, He Chuanqi's theory uses the Western development index as a measure for growth assessment, which makes it dependent on Western indicators, and uses Western countries as a point of reference for Chinese modernisation. The West is referred to as a uniform amorphous entity of progress and development. Modernisation is an abstraction, and one that unduly influences how Chinese national goals are formulated and the idea of the modernised Chinese nation is constructed.

The portrayal of modernisation in predominately economic-numerical form and the reliance on Western theories of modernisation are striking. They are even reflected in a trend observed by some studies on contemporary visual representation and official propaganda. One such study by Landsberger concluded that in the official discussions of the 1980s there

was an almost complete domination of Western symbols of progress.<sup>30</sup> In the 1980s–1990s many writings largely undermined the functional approach in social science and disputed the linear conception of universal historical process. These writings are accessed in China and, in fact, have influenced a number of mainland scholars.<sup>31</sup> Nevertheless, the dominant scholarly research continues to see modernisation as an evolutionary process with economics and technological innovations at its core. The production of Chinese national identity is informed by the linear vision of history evolving along the development progress, simplistic interpretation of culture, and somewhat passive and uncritical acceptance of the experiences of some Western societies as the only legitimate source of development knowledge. China's official formulations of its development process not only have become rooted in and dependent on the Western orthodoxies, but also have produced a generalised vision of the West that suppresses difference within China.

### **China as a map of the history of civilisation**

The Second Modernisation Theory is presented as a contribution by Chinese scholars to general theories of modernisation, but it is also presented in essentially Chinese national terms. He Chuanqi utilises China's national geo-body to draw an analogy with the global modernisation process.<sup>32</sup> He specifically refers to the Yangtze River that flows from the west to the east, which, he argues, spatially illustrates the temporal progression of civilisation and world modernisation: 'From the upper to the lower reaches, the levels of both development and civilisation rise (despite fluctuations). The process of this change is logical, and is highly similar to the process of world modernisation' (see figure 1).<sup>33</sup> It is interesting to note that traditionally the Yellow River in the north has been presented as a cradle of Chinese civilisation and the birthplace of the Chinese nation. The Yellow River often serves as a

symbol of the Chinese nation in scholarly, literary, and popular accounts. But the reference to the Yangtze River is employed for a different purpose. While it illustrates China's unique development model, according to He, it also invites an analogy with China's progression through the whole history of civilisation known to humanity. In He Chuanqi's words, 'As if human civilization had flowed from the upper reaches, to the middle reaches, to the lower reaches, and to the estuary. We call this phenomenon the Yangtze River Model of the long history of human civilization'.<sup>34</sup> Thus, China is a home to those societies at the beginning of the development of civilisation as well as to those nearing the height of civilisation, as it approaches the post-industrial knowledge society.

The Yangtze River Model is viewed as an 'historical section' for analysis of the modernisation process. Going to the upper reaches of the Yangtze River in Qinghai and Sichuan provinces is, in other words, reminiscent of travelling back in time to the origins of civilisation. The lower reaches and the estuary, with their industrial societies and early traces of knowledge societies, are at the forefront of the modernisation process, but cannot compare to some societies outside China that have higher modernisation indexes. According to the authors of the *China Modernisation Reports*, the developments of these societies provide an orientation and trajectory for how Chinese modernisation will evolve.

### **Figure 1. Yangtze River Model**




Figure 1 Level of Civilization in Yangtze River Valley in 2000  
 Note: QH represents Qinghai, SH represents Shanghai, etc.

Source: *China Modernisation Report Outlook (2001-2007)*, p 101.

While the geographical symbols of national territory are usually thought to embody a particular nation and society, He Chuanqi attempts to place the entire historical process known to humanity within the territorial confines of China. China thereby maps out the development process of the whole world, in addition to China's own development. China becomes a reference point for general thinking about development while providing a particular model of development. And through projecting historical time onto China's national space the Yangtze River Model serves as a 'spatial expression' of the progress of human civilisation. He Chuanqi recognises, however, that this model can only account for the period of human civilisation from the First to the Second Modernisations, as no place in China has completed the process of Second Modernisation yet. The reference point for China's future modernisation is an idealised vision of the modernisation end of other societies, predominately in the West. Not only does He Chuanqi not compare China's experiences to those of developing countries of the global South, the roles of China's



neighbours, such as South Korea, Japan, India and Russia are not mentioned in the Second Modernisation Theory.

The Yangtze Model, with its fusion of the temporal process with geographical space deems China's choice of development as the only acceptable one. It thus essentially subscribes to a mode of knowledge that has been produced and already heavily criticised by many. John Agnew asserts that 'turning time into space' has dominated much of contemporary thinking about 'national development', not only in the spaces subjected to colonialism but also in the parts of the world that were outside of direct colonial rule.<sup>35</sup> Despite his apparently strong commitment to produce a distinctive Chinese theory of development, He Chuanqi submits to the colonised mentality dictated by a particular interpretation of the development experience in the West. Through projecting the entire process of civilisation onto the national map of China, his theory labels certain localities within China as developed and others as backward. And, unavoidably, the theory oversimplifies local experiences and practices, through categorising them as 'advanced' or 'primitive'.

The Yangtze River Model of the *China Modernisation Report* displays the politics of representation and identity. On the one hand, it utilises the language of development to present China as a developing country which aspires to follow the development path paved by other more modern, Western societies. It relies on the dominant language and knowledge system of the West, which results in the marginalisation of other modes of knowledge and experiences of development.<sup>36</sup> Its recognition of China's development stage and future orientation legitimizes the dominant thinking about the modernisation process, and it a priori rejects any possible alternatives. On the other hand, the Yangtze River Model groups China's regions and diverse ethnic groups into categories along the modernisation vector, producing hierarchies of levels of development and social groups. In this process, it assigns localities and their populations' particular characteristics and makes them general and absolute. Not

only are the western, central, and eastern regions of China organised into a hierarchical relationship, but a binary opposition between the Han majority (*Han zu*) and ethnic minorities (*shaoshu minzu*) is asserted.<sup>37</sup> When the category of *minzu* was attuned to the Stalinist definition of nationality in the 1950s–1960s, a nationality’s level of socio-economic development was considered crucial to the identification and recognition of its minority status. Now ethnic minorities’ supposedly low level of development is seen as a main impediment to their full inclusion in China’s modernisation project. The *China Modernisation Report* and its theoretical framework also do not allow space for diverse types of knowledge and experiences of development within China. The report’s preoccupation with the production of a particular vision of development for China extends to the individual values considered conducive to the modernisation process.

### **Humanistic aspects of modernisation**

Since the 1990s Chinese theories of modernisation have emphasised that modernisation goals are not limited to economic indicators of China’s development, and that modernisation also involves nurturing and realizing certain nonmaterial aspects of modernisation.<sup>38</sup> The non-material features of China’s development path have constituted an important part of official thinking on modernisation since the start of the reforms, but became more prominent in the last decade. Talk of these dimensions has been fuelled by the rush to rediscover and revive China’s culture and values. Human-centred perspectives on modernisation have most distinctly manifested themselves in the officially endorsed discourses on spiritual civilisation (*jingshen wenming*), ‘population quality’ (*renkou suzhi*) and, most recently, ‘humanistic modernisation’ (*ren de xiandaihua*).

The development of a spiritual civilisation was identified by Chinese leadership as essential for the realisation of the modernisation project in the early days of the reforms and

the opening up of China. Back in 1981, the central government published a document entitled ‘Suggestions Concerning the Promotion of Decorum and Courtesy and the Efforts to Build Socialist Spiritual Civilisation’, which delineated ‘five stresses and four beauties’ aimed at providing general guidance for the daily life of the Chinese people.<sup>39</sup> According to the official explanation, spiritual civilisation was comprised of two aspects: cultural (education, science, art, literature, and so on) and ideological (Marxist theory). Spiritual civilisation was ‘manifested in a higher educational, scientific and cultural level and in higher ideological, political and moral standards’.<sup>40</sup> In 1982, patriotism encompassing ‘three loves’ (love for the motherland, socialism, and the party) was identified as one of the crucial factors promoting spiritual civilisation and added to the other two aspects of spiritual civilisation.<sup>41</sup>

Related to the discourse on spiritual civilisation was the popularisation of the notion of ‘population quality’ (*renkou suzhi*), which was first used in party documents in the early 1980s. While *suzhi* lacks a uniform definition, it vaguely refers to the physiology, morality, scientific and cultural consciousness, and psychology of a person. It has been employed in Chinese official and popular discourses to refer to what Chinese society lacks. It calls attention to China’s ‘internalised sense of the lack of development’, as Anagnost characterised it.<sup>42</sup> ‘Low population quality’ (*renkou suzhi di*) was recognized as one of the main impediments to China’s modernisation drive. But the official idea that one can understand China’s hampered development by the lack of *suzhi*, as Yan Hairong observes, is essentially tautological, because the lack of development lies at the heart of the *suzhi* notion, and the promotion of development is seen as the only solution.<sup>43</sup> The official formulation of the *suzhi* problem and the advocacy of a developmentalist agenda as a way of overcoming it cover up a multitude of factors that have contributed to the disparities in Chinese society. As an idealised and absolute notion, *suzhi* designates an attribute of a modern subject, and those with more of it are considered ‘more deserving of the rights of citizenship’.<sup>44</sup>

The debate that has recently emerged on humanistic modernisation (*ren de xiandaihua*) builds on and reflects the earlier discussions on spiritual civilisation and population quality. Humanistic modernisation has been presented as the key to the national modernisation quest and the main engine and guarantor of the modernisation process.<sup>45</sup> Zheng Yongting, one of the scholars of modernisation, argues that population quality and people's consciousness constitute the two main elements of humanistic modernisation.<sup>46</sup> He stresses that the process of transformation from a traditional to a modern society is aimed at training and advancing people's modern consciousness, ability, and mentality (*yishi, nengli, xinli*). These attributes are constituent of the human quality and are seen as an underlying condition necessary for a successful modernisation process.<sup>47</sup> He contends that the successful pursuit of humanistic modernisation is premised on the advancement of a knowledge economy and society, which he sees as the ultimate goal of China's current development. Zheng Yongting states: 'The difference between traditional and modern people is that modern subjects can adapt to the demands and development changes quickly, and use knowledge and creativity to change the world'.<sup>48</sup>

The reorientation of societal values towards the values compatible with the realisation of modernisation goals also constitutes an important aspect of He Chuanqi's Second Modernisation Theory. He asserts that the construction of a 'knowledge society' (*zhishi shehui*) and a 'knowledge civilisation' (*zhishi wenming*)—the goals of the Second Modernisation—involves a particular way of thinking (*sixiang guannian*), a particular work attitude (*gongzuo taidu*), a particular lifestyle (*shenghuo fangshi*), particular societal relations (*shehui guanxi*), and so forth.<sup>49</sup> He stipulates that the attitude and consciousness of an individual, rather than the actions of the government, are central to this transformation. Knowledge production forces and labour are key to He Chuanqi's formulation of the advancement of a knowledge society.<sup>50</sup> According to him, a knowledge society constitutes

the highest level of human civilisation development and possesses the highest level of human quality.

In these discursive deliberations on the desired advancement of human qualities in the process of modernisation, several dichotomies are produced. There is a general recognition that the origins of modernisation are found in the West, but it is emphasised that the long history of Chinese civilisation and traditions cannot be neglected in the process of modernisation.<sup>51</sup> The pursuit of humanistic modernisation and civilisation is premised on a belief in the glorious Chinese past and an aspired future. Chinese culture, where Confucianism is regarded as the centrepiece of the tradition (with Buddhism and Daoism being supplementary, and Islam and other religions in China considered irrelevant), faces the double challenge of meeting the demands of modernisation and improving relations with the West. A range of asserted differences between Chinese and Western cultures—in people's mentalities, ways of thinking, characters, and lifestyles—is presented as a cultural disparity, and Chinese people are called on 'to adapt to the modern way of thinking' (*shiyiing xiandai shehui de xitong siwei*).<sup>52</sup> Although the roots of the problems related to China's development are deemed endogenous to China and not solely attributable to Western imperialism, the generalised West is presented as the benchmark against which China measures its advancement and progress.

The dominant discussions of China's humanistic modernisation stipulate that the whole of China's population needs to raise its qualities and level of civilization compared to the West. But, these discussions also extensively employ oppositional binaries found within China, such as 'China's East in comparison to the West' as Zheng Yongting writes. Zheng also argues that, 'compared to China's interior, the coastal region develops quicker in economic and social terms'.<sup>53</sup> These domestic disparities are presented as the main issues to be resolved to attain humanistic modernisation. The discourse on humanistic modernisation

portrays a particular picture of the modern Chinese, and creates a series of hierarchical relationships between diverse groups. Those who have more access to knowledge production (especially scientific and technological knowledge production) and greater ability to contribute to the modernisation process are positioned on a higher step of modernisation hierarchy. These ostensible producers of knowledge are often synonymous with China's new middle class, and are favoured as desirable for modernising China. The new social strata of private entrepreneurs, small-business owners, and managerial-level staff in private or foreign-funded enterprises are praised for their contribution to China's economic development.<sup>54</sup> Proximity to this growing middle class has become a normative designation of social citizenship in China, and is often measured by consumer power and urban residence.<sup>55</sup> Those who contribute less to knowledge production are lined up behind them in accordance with their contributions to reaching the modernisation goals. Those at the very end of this chain are often blamed for slowing down the pace of modernisation. China's minority populations are frequently referred to as hindrances to the state's modernisation. A deputy head of the Nationalities Commission of Gansu province on one occasion said that 'minorities' low level of development is often linked to their low level of "civilisation", i.e., to their allegedly backward culture, education, science/technology and human resources'.<sup>56</sup> Chinese scholars have concluded that population quality, however defined, 'is for the most part higher in Han areas than in minority areas'.<sup>57</sup> The minority label a priori precludes the possibility that its bearer can take on the role of a generator of knowledge valuable for Chinese modernisation. Hegemonic thinking about modernisation simply does not allow ethnic minorities to be identified with modernity and high population quality. It privileges the Han majority and its dominant views on the modernisation path.

### **International modernisation**

Since Deng Xiaoping's inauguration of the reform agenda in 1978 until the mid-2000s, China's modernisation had been largely presented as domestically oriented. Foreign capital and investments had been welcomed in China for the purpose of stimulating economic growth. But the mid-2000s witnessed a shift in orientation, with the leadership emphasising combining modernisation with China's greater engagement with the rest of the world. This shift found its official formulation in Hu Jintao's call for building a 'harmonious world', which is the foreign policy equivalent of his concept 'harmonious society'.<sup>58</sup> Reflecting this development in the official thinking, *China Modernisation Report 2008* focuses on the favourable international environment for China's economic growth and development.<sup>59</sup>

The report opens by contending that international modernisation is an important ingredient of China's development path, which is restricted by two types of environment. This argument is based on an analogy with genetics, which considers the genotype of an individual who exists within the living environment. Correspondingly, national modernisation takes place within the international environment.<sup>60</sup> The report asserts that while China has so far concentrated on the national aspect of modernisation, it has recently started looking more closely at the interaction between the international environment and national modernisation, with a view to influencing the international climate in favour of China's modernisation. The authors of the report stress that 'national modernisation is the final destination, while international modernisation is just a measure. International modernisation is a path to enhancing national level, but not the objective'.<sup>61</sup>

By the term 'international modernisation', the authors of the report refer to the international interactions in the course of modernisation and the correlations between national modernisation and the international environment. They argue that international modernisation involves international interactions in the fields of politics, economy, society, culture, international systems, geopolitics and 'national quality'.<sup>62</sup> A high national quality,

echoing the notion of population quality projected onto the whole state, is seen as the key to the pursuit of modernisation; GDP per capita, figures of economic growth, and education (especially in the fields of science and technology) are particularly stressed.<sup>63</sup> Importantly, and this is similar to the emphasis on knowledge production as a marker of a modern subject in the discussions on humanistic modernisation, this new turn to incorporate international dimensions of the modernisation process stresses ‘strategic profit... including concepts and knowledge’.<sup>64</sup> The analysis used to outline the particulars of international modernisation is identical to the theoretical line of the Second Modernisation Theory, which informs and structures the *China Modernisation Reports*. The analysis in the Second Modernisation Theory at the level of human beings and societies is extrapolated to the level of the international space in analyses of international modernisation.

The report presents international modernisation theory as China’s alternative interpretation of modernisation and related to dependency theory, world system theory, international relations theory and globalisation theory.<sup>65</sup> But it does not only present an interpretative theory, as the report’s central objective is to make suggestions for developments at the international level to benefit China’s modernisation process, including by enhancing China’s position internationally.<sup>66</sup> One of the report’s central contentions is that success in modernisation is a combination of international and domestic factors. The report fuses theories of international relations and the Chinese conception of modernisation to produce China’s strategy for becoming an important international power. A significant part of the report looks specifically at how to enhance China’s international modernisation and puts forward a strategic proposal for this modernisation for the twenty-first century. The twenty-first century is viewed as the period of China’s development and revival, in contrast to the twentieth century, which is characterised by China’s struggle for national survival.

The report advances a Peace Dove Strategy for China’s international modernisation in the twenty-first century, which the authors suggest will improve China’s international



modernisation prospects (see figure 2). The report reaffirms the key role of the United Nations in leading and guaranteeing the world’s peace and development, but proposes to significantly strengthen the role of the Asian region in the world. To this end, it proposes that a new regional organisation, Asia Association, be set up with its headquarters on the Chinese island of Hainan. Within the framework of this organisation, the report advocates, China should deepen its cooperation with the West and East through APEC and the Asia-Europe Economic Cooperation, which the report proposes to upgrade to the Asia-Europe Meeting. China’s next priorities in international relationships are with the countries of the global South, particularly the regions of Africa, Oceania, and South America. More specifically, the report suggests that China strategically improve its international relations with ‘innovative countries, the resource-abounding countries, the large-population countries, the cultural countries, the friendly countries, and the surrounding countries’.<sup>67</sup>

**Figure 2. Peace Dove Strategy of China’s International Modernisation**





图 3-16 中国国际现代化的“和平鸽”战略的地理结构示意图  
(本图示意图。完整世界地图见中国地图出版社出版的世界地图)



Source: *China Modernisation Report 2008*

The report develops the officially pronounced Chinese foreign policy agenda and presents it in a scientific and theoretical framework as an essential aspect of China's national modernisation project. The scientific language of the modernisation theory relies on time-series and cross-sectional analysis. The report's research team thus not only generates particular knowledge of the modernisation process, but employs it to present China's official policies in a 'scientific framework' and to represent China's stance in international relations in allegedly scientifically verifiable terms. It is palpable in the Modernisation Report's employment of particular 'scientifically reliable' quantitative methodologies to produce 'The Objective Power Index' and to evaluate China's position in the international arena.<sup>68</sup> Here the power of the apparently neutral modern language of science is employed for the production of a particular vision of progress and modernisation is crucial in concealing the workings of power in the words of declared truth. Scientific language serves as a complicit element in the production of the power of China's state.<sup>69</sup>

The model of global and regional governance suggested by the report is explicitly China-centric with the final goal to raise China's profile in Asia and the world. A favourable international environment, in other words, would serve China's race to increase its national quality and modernisation goals. The final objective of China's advancement of its relations

with other countries in Asia and the world is to enhance its own material foundation. But there is an interesting correlation asserted between a favourable international environment for China's modernisation and world peace. By fostering such a favourable international environment through the promotion of new institutions and ideas, the report suggests China can also bring peace to the world.<sup>70</sup> International modernisation theory, with its prioritisation of science, technology and capital as the main components of the development process, strikingly echoes Henry Truman's notion of a 'fair deal', which at the end of the Second World War was proposed as an American solution to the world's problems of poverty and underdevelopment.<sup>71</sup> At least at the rhetorical level, this ambitious programme was presented as being concerned with the problem of poverty around the globe. *Modernisation Report* makes an equally ambitious attempt to raise the profile of China around the world for the purpose of China's domestic modernisation.

It is remarkable that African and Latin American countries are included in the tail of the White Dove model led by Asia with China in the centre. This view places China in the middle of the global development shift where developing countries are not part of the driving force of transformations, but follow the directions of development set by China. Chinese leaders and scholars not only have embraced the idea of China-led globalisation, but put forward theoretical interpretations of China-led international modernisation. While some Western scholars identify socio-economic and political dangers and opportunities for the world associated with China's rise,<sup>72</sup> official discourse in China articulates a new 'Yellow Man's Burden', a mission to develop the countries in the Global South, which China has shouldered on its way to become a great power.<sup>73</sup> This self-professed global role reverberates with the party-state's domestic missionary approach towards its ethnic minorities who have been customarily presented as liberated, supported and guided in their development by the 'more advanced' sector of the Chinese society. The recent White Paper on Ethnic Minorities, for example, states that 'the ethnic minorities have..., coupled with

assistance from economically advanced parts of China and state preferential policies, striven to build better homes for themselves'.<sup>74</sup>

The authors of the *China Modernisation Report* reiterate the prevalent conceptions and theories of modernisation developed, popularised, and in some instances treated as the norm in the West, although those ideas have been increasingly challenged. The authors do not question the hegemonic thinking on development, but heavily rely on it in their representations and normative prescriptions of China's modernisation path. And in doing so, they fail to liberate their thinking from the Western mentality about the ways of living in other societies. Indeed, they largely adopt this mentality as the only possible way to conceive of the issues of progress and development. Rather than developing an alternative model to Western modernisation, Chinese official perspective further perpetuates the hierarchies inherent to it.

### **Conclusion**

The pursuit of modernisation is presented in China's official discourse as an omnipresent and inescapable goal, influencing modes of thinking, acting, and living at personal and state levels. The dominance of the modernisation agenda in official and scholarly analyses demonstrates how China's domestic and international realities are constructed through the prism of modernisation. China's modernisation discourse, much of which advocates comprehensive development, is concerned with the politics of representation and identity and the reproduction of the Chinese nation. Its vision of the future informs the articulation of the development agenda for Chinese society. The future, especially its 'scientific' prediction and numerical expression, becomes the vantage point for viewing the national condition. Not only the future, but everyday experiences and state foreign policy are interpreted through the application of allegedly 'scientific' principles.

The narrow understanding of modernisation as the means of the production of numerical indicators and a mode of following a certain developmental model inhibits embracing cultural diversity and considering people's well-being and happiness. Also, such restricted theorising excludes pursuing multiple types of modernisation or incorporating the voices of different social groups. The Second Modernisation Theory, for example, treats modernisation as a defining feature of China's national character and basically neglects China's peculiar diversity. It subordinates or ignores alternative paths to modernity. A uniform modernisation project is based on the identification of certain core values and ideals as showing the only true path to development; it dismisses difference as conservative or backward. Certain sectors of the population, such as ethnic migrants, are unavoidably labelled the antitheses of modernisation and therefore risk being excluded from the project.

The Second Modernisation Theory not only reiterates China's inferior status in relation to Western societies, who are ahead of China in their development processes, but presents a particular picture of China's domestic situation. It relies on and reproduces a series of hierarchical relationships within and outside China in its articulation of the modernisation process. Despite China's status as a developing nation, modernisation scholars recognise China's growing influence in the international arena, and emphasise the value of knowledge production in the contemporary world, where China, in their opinion, should accelerate. China's growing power in the world could be asserted, in their view, through the generation of new ideas, norms, and international institutions. The objective, however, appears to be not the improvement of the well-being of the world, but of China's modernisation.

China's official scholarly attempts to produce China's own modernisation theory are incapacitated by the conviction in the validity of 'scientific' interpretations of human development. While these attempts cannot effectively foretell China's development, they unmistakably point to China's aspirations to be a developed and internationally respected nation. This drive to convince itself and the world that China's is a distinct and deserving

development model, and the way Chinese scholars think about China's and the world's development process demonstrate an almost fatal inability to escape the legacies of Western imperialism. Far from overcoming these legacies, Chinese officials and scholars adopt and recreate them through generating news relations of inequality and domination within and outside China. An alternative, and perhaps more fruitful, way to approach the task of Chinese development knowledge production could start with the scholars' critical reflection on the outside influences in their thinking and the efforts to resourcefully acknowledge, respect, and build on the variety of existing development experiences and perspectives within and outside China. Problematisation and destabilisation of such established binary oppositions as West/East, North/South/, developed/backward, and civilised/uncivilised should be at the heart of this task.

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<sup>1</sup> R Peerenboom, *China Modernizes: Threat to the West or Model to the Rest?*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007; B Bakken, *The Exemplary Society: Human Improvement, Social Control, and the Dangers of Modernity in China*, 2000, New York: Oxford University Press.

<sup>2</sup> L Bai, 'The influence of Chinese perceptions of modernisation on the value of education: a case study of Chinese students in New Zealand', *China: an International Journal* 6(2), 2008: pp 208-236; Y Zhang and J Harwood, 'Modernization and tradition in an age of globalization: Cultural values in Chinese television commercials', *Journal of Communication* 54(1), 2004: pp 156-172.

<sup>3</sup> For an analysis of the interplay of Chinese and foreign ideas in the intellectual debates in China see C Hughes, 'The enduring function of the 'substance-essence' ('*ti-yong*') dichotomy in Chinese nationalism' in W A Callahan and E Barabantseva (eds), *Soft Power, Norms and Foreign Policy*, book manuscript.

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<sup>4</sup> Worship of Western values was intrinsic in the 1980s criticism of Chinese traditional culture and was epitomised in the TV series *River Elegy*. Public debates on the need of Westernisation resurfaced in the 2000s with the publication of popular book *the Ugly Chinese* by Bai Yang and most recently *Chinese History Revisited* by Xiao Jiansheng. All three works were banned in the PRC. A number of Chinese intellectuals, referred to as liberals by the scholars of Chinese intellectual thought, have called for embracement of Western values and institutions. For more on the intellectual debates in contemporary China see J Fewsmith, *China Since Tiananmen*, 2001, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Zhang Xudong, (ed) *Whither China? Intellectual Politics in Contemporary China*, 2002, Durham: Duke University Press, G Davies, *Worrying about China: the Language of Chinese Critical Inquiry*, 2007, Harvard: Harvard University Press.

<sup>5</sup> A King, 'The Emergence of Alternative Modernity in East Asia', in Dominic Sachsenmaier, Jens Riedel, & Shmuel N. Eisenstadt (eds), *Reflections on Multiple Modernities: European, Chinese and Other Interpretations*, Leiden: Brill, 2002, pp 140-152.

<sup>6</sup> K W Radtke, 'Troubled Identity', in Kurt Werner Radtke & Tony Saich (ed), *China's Modernisation*, Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1993, p 20; F Wakeman, 'Chinese modernity', in Dominic Sachsenmaier, Jens Riedel, and Shmuel N. Eisenstadt, *Reflections on Multiple Modernities: European, Chinese and Other Interpretations*, p160.

<sup>7</sup> Jiang Zemin, 'Speed up the reform: opening up and the modernisation construction in order to win greater victories in the project of socialism with Chinese characteristics', *People's Daily*, 21 October, 1992.

<sup>8</sup> 'Scientific development' was pronounced by the PRC's president Hu Jintao in 2003 in the report from the Third Plenary Session of the 16th Party Congress. Since then it became presented as China's official guiding development principle and frequently used in the official characterisations of China's development. For more see J Fewsmith, 'Promoting the

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Scientific Development Concept', *China Leadership Monitor* 11, Summer 2004, <http://www.hoover.org/publications/clm/issues/2904171.html>, accessed 15 November 2009. For an apt illustration of the usage of this rhetoric see '17th Party Congress delegates talk about scientific development road', *People's Daily Online*, 23 September 2008, <http://english.people.com.cn/90002/91580/91598/6504433.html>, accessed on 30 September 2009.

<sup>9</sup> This is not to say that there is no alternative to the dominant discourse on China's modernisation path represented by the Second Modernisation Theory and the *China Modernisation Reports*. There is an important body of literature highlighting local knowledge and development practices, which hardly fit the prescribed development model. But most of this literature is produced by researchers whose research agendas and goals go against the line of official thinking. There are also other statistical reports produced in China; for example, the Human Development Report. But they represent a form of knowledge developed by the United Nations rather than by China's official and scholarly discourses.

<sup>10</sup> He Chuanqi, *Dongfang fuxing: Xiandaihua de San Tiao Daolu*. Beijing: Commercial Press, 2003

<sup>11</sup> He Chuanqi. *Di Er ge Xiandaihua: Renlei Wenming Jincheng de Jushi*, Beijing: Gaoji jiaoyu chubanshe, 1999, p 389.

<sup>12</sup> He Chuanqi, *Dongfang Fuxing: Xiandaihua de San Tiao Daolu*, pp 248-249.

<sup>13</sup> He Chuanqi et al., *China Modernisation Report Outlook (2001-2007)*, Beijing: Beijing University Press, 2007, p 152.

<sup>14</sup> W Callahan, 'Chinese visions of world order: post-hegemonic or a new hegemony?', *The International Studies Review* 10(4), 2008, pp 749-761 (13) discusses a similar trend in



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Chinese social sciences where the production of distinctly Chinese notions is regarded as a manifestation of China's growing soft power.

<sup>15</sup> He Chuanqi et al., *China Modernisation Report Outlook (2001-2007)*, p. 145.

<sup>16</sup> He Chuanqi. Di Erg e Xiandaihua: Renlei Wenming Jincheng de Jushi, pp 257-258.

<sup>17</sup> He Chuanqi et al., *China Modernisation Report Outlook (2001-2007)*.

<sup>18</sup> Q Tian, 'China develops its West: motivation, strategy, and prospect', *Journal of Contemporary China* 13(41), 2004, pp 611-636. An illustrative example of this view is the Central Government's 2005 *White Paper on Regional Autonomy for Ethnic Minorities in China* which states that 'the ethnic minorities are encouraged to adopt new, scientific, civilized and healthy customs in daily life...',

[http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-02/28/content\\_420337.htm](http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-02/28/content_420337.htm), accessed 30 September 2009.

<sup>19</sup> Qin Jue and Jin, Ginggao, 'Zhongguo gongchandang di san dai lingdao jiben guanyu shaoshu minzu he minzu diqu jingji fazhan de lilun yu zhengce', *Minzu wenti yanjiu* 11, 2003, pp 16-22.

<sup>20</sup> Xiong Jingming, 'Xibu kaifa de wenhua ziyuan yu fazhan moshi', *Dushu* 3, 2002, pp. 127-130.

<sup>21</sup> He et al, *China Modernisation Report Outlook (2001-2007)*, p 102.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid., p 104.

<sup>23</sup> R L Doty, *Imperial Encounters: The Politics of Representation in North-South Relations*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996, p 10.

<sup>24</sup> Radke, 'Troubled identity', p.32.

<sup>25</sup> C Shih, *Negotiating Ethnicity in China: Citizenship as a Response to the State*, London: Routledge, 2002.

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<sup>26</sup> F Christiansen, 'Zhang Jian's Bianfa Pingyu – a place for gradual reform in late Imperial and early Republican China?' in Kurt Werner Radtke & Tony Saich (eds), *China's Modernisation*, Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1993, p 55.

<sup>27</sup> Radke, 'Troubled Identity', p 15.

<sup>28</sup> A Appadurai, *Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalisation*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997, p 9

<sup>29</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>30</sup> S Landsberger, 'Chinese visual propaganda during the "Four Modernisations" (1978-1988)', in Kurt Werner Radtke and Tony Saich (ed), *China's Modernisation*, p 188.

<sup>31</sup> Wang Hui, 'Contemporary Chinese thought and the question of modernity' in Theodore Hutters (ed), *China's New Order*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003, pp 141-187.

<sup>32</sup> On the historical emergence of China's geobody see WA Callahan, 'The Cartography of National Humiliation and the Emergence of China's Geobody', *Public Culture* 21(1), 2009, pp 141-173.

<sup>33</sup> He Chuanqi et al, *China Modernisation Report Outlook (2001-2007)*, p106.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*, p102.

<sup>35</sup> J Agnew, *Geopolitics: Re-visioning World Politics*. London: Routledge, 1998.

<sup>36</sup> For other examples of the similar argument see A Escobar, *Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third World*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995, p 13; A Dirlik, 'Modernity as History: Post-Revolutionary China, Globalisation, and the Question of Modernity', *Social History* 27(1), 2002, p 36.

<sup>37</sup> For more on the localisation of China's ethnic minorities within particular geographical and social spaces see E Barabantseva, 'Development as Localization: Ethnic Minorities in

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China's Official Discourse on the Western Development Project', *Critical Asian Studies* 41(2), 2009, pp 225-254.

<sup>38</sup> It is nevertheless often stressed that China's priority is to create the material base for spiritual advancement. The Party-formulated development strategy and the government's position on development were stipulated in the State Council's 2005 'White Paper on China's Peaceful Development Road', which reiterated the primary role of economic growth. For the full text of the White Paper, see *People's Daily Online*, 22 December, 2005, [http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200512/22/eng20051222\\_230059.html](http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200512/22/eng20051222_230059.html), accessed 24 June 2009; in August 2006, the Central Committee's Foreign Affairs Meeting adopted directives stressing that 'economic development should remain the central theme of [China's] foreign policy'. See 'Central Committee's foreign affairs meeting held in Beijing; Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao made keynote speeches', *People's Daily*, 24 August 2006.

<sup>39</sup> Five stresses are the stress on decorum, courtesy, hygiene, discipline and morals, and the 'four beauties' are to do with the improvement of mind, language, behaviour, and environment. See C Chang, 'Promotion of socialist spiritual civilization on the Chinese mainland', *Issues and Studies*, August, 1983, p 23.

<sup>40</sup> Hu Yaobang quoted in *ibid.*, p 26.

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>42</sup> A Anagnost, *National Past-Times: Narrative, Representation, and Power in Modern China*. Durham: Duke University Press, 1997.

<sup>43</sup> H Yan, 'Neoliberal governmentality and neohumanism: organising suzhi/value flow through labor recruitment', *Cultural Anthropology* 18(4), 2003, p 496.

<sup>44</sup> A Anagnost, 'The corporeal politics of quality (Suzhi)', *Public Culture* 16(2), 2004, p 194.

<sup>45</sup> Zhang Zhongliang, *Xiandaihua Xin Lun. Yi Dang de San Dai Lingdao Jiti Shehui Zhuyi Lilun Yanjiu*, Hunan Renmin Chubanshe, 2003, p 359.

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<sup>46</sup> Zheng Yongting, *Rende Xiandaihua Lilun yu Shijian*, Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe, 2005, p

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<sup>47</sup> Ibid., pp 6-7.

<sup>48</sup> Ibid., p 233.

<sup>49</sup> He Chuanqi. *Di Er ge Xiandaihua: Renlei Wenming Jincheng de Jushi*, p 409.

<sup>50</sup> Ibid., p 408.

<sup>51</sup> Zheng Yongting, *Rende Xiandaihua Lilun yu Shijian*, p 219.

<sup>52</sup> Ibid.

<sup>53</sup> Ibid., p 228.

<sup>54</sup> See “‘New social stratum’ playing important role in China's development: senior official’, *People’s Daily Online*, 15 February 2007,

[http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200702/15/eng20070215\\_350141.html](http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200702/15/eng20070215_350141.html), accessed 24 June 2009.

<sup>55</sup> A Anagnost, ‘From “Class” to “Social Strata”’: grasping the social totality in reform-era China’, *Third World Quarterly*, 29 (3), 2008, pp 497-519.

<sup>56</sup> Cited in Zhang Chonggen, Na Ren Aoerqi, Sun Zhaowen. *Zhongguo minzu gongzuo fang tanlu*, Beijing: Jingshan jiaoyu chubanshe, 1996, p 260.

<sup>57</sup> Li quoted in H Yan, ‘Neoliberal Governmentality and Neohumanism: Organising Suzhi/Value Flow through Labor Recruitment’, *Cultural Anthropology* 18(4), 2003, p 496.

<sup>58</sup> For more see ‘Decisions by the CCP Central Committee on Building Socialism and Harmonious society, and Other Important Issues’, 6<sup>th</sup> plenum of the Central Committee, October 2006.

<sup>59</sup> The themes of China Modernisation Reports dutifully mirror the priority policy orientations of Chinese leadership. The topic for the 2009 Report is Cultural Modernisation, 2007 – Ecological Modernisation, 2006 – Societal Modernisation, 2005 – Economic

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Modernisation, 2004 – Regional Modernisation, 2003 – Modernisation Theory, Orientations and Prospects.

<sup>60</sup> *China Modernisation Report 2008: a Study on the International Modernisation* (Zhongguo xiandaihua baogao 2008 – guoji xiandaihua yanjiu). Beijing: Beijing University Press, p i.

<sup>61</sup> *Ibid.*, p iii.

<sup>62</sup> *Ibid.*, p v.

<sup>63</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>64</sup> *Ibid.*, pp iii-iv.

<sup>65</sup> *Ibid.*, p v.

<sup>66</sup> *Ibid.*, p vii.

<sup>67</sup> *Ibid.*, p xiii.

<sup>68</sup> *Ibid.*, pp xiv-xv.

<sup>69</sup> For more on the centrality of science in contemporary China see S Greenalgh and E A Winckler, *Governing China's Populations: From Leninist to Neoliberal Biopolitics*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005.

<sup>70</sup> *China Modernisation Report 2008*: p xiii.

<sup>71</sup> Escobar, *Encountering Development*, pp 3-4.

<sup>72</sup> J Henderson, 'China and global development: toward a Global-Asian Era?', *Contemporary Politics* 14(4), 2008, pp 375-392.

<sup>73</sup> P Nyiri, 'The yellow man's burden: Chinese migrants on a civilizing mission', *The China Journal* 56, July 2006, pp 83-106.

<sup>74</sup> 'White Paper on Ethnic Policy: China's Ethnic Policy and Common Prosperity and Development of All Ethnic Groups', 27 September 2009, [http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2009-09/27/content\\_8743072.htm](http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2009-09/27/content_8743072.htm), accessed 15 November 2009. In contrast to the two previous White papers (1999 and 2005) the language

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of this paper allows more agency for ethnic minorities. 'Ethnic minorities' in the English version of the document are almost always made a subject in the sentence, unlike in previous documents where they were part of the passive voice structures, emphasising their role of recipients of the goods distributed by the Chinese state. On the historical and current civilizational policies of the Chinese state towards its ethnic minorities see D C Gladney, 'Representing nationality in China: refiguring majority/minority identities', *Journal of Asian Studies* 53(1), 1994, pp 92-123; S Harrell, *Cultural Encounters on China's Ethnic Frontiers*, 1995, Seattle: University of Washington Press; S L Friedman, 'Embodying civility: civilizing processes and symbolic citizenship in Southeastern China', *Journal of Asian Studies* 1(63), 2004, pp 687-718.